Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, University of Texas at Austin by Hearron, Marc A. et al.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Society of American Law Teachers Archive Special Collections
2015
Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents,
University of Texas at Austin
Marc A. Hearron
David D. Cross
Bryan J. Leitch
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/saltarchive
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United
States Commons
This Court Brief is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at
the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief for Society of American Law Teachers as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, University of Texas at Austin, No. 14-981
(U.S. June 23, 2016).
No. 14-981 
================================================================ 
In The 
Supreme Court of the United States 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
ABIGAIL NOEL FISHER, PETITIONER 
v. 
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN, ET AL. 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
BRIEF FOR SOCIETY OF AMERICAN 
LAW TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE 
SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS 
---------------------------------  --------------------------------- 
 MARC A. HEARRON
 Counsel of Record 
DAVID D. CROSS 
BRYAN J. LEITCH 
MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP 
2000 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20006 
(202) 778-1663 
MHearron@mofo.com 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
 Society of American 
 Law Teachers
OCTOBER 30, 2015 
================================================================ 
COCKLE LEGAL BRIEFS (800) 225-6964 
WWW.COCKLELEGALBRIEFS.COM 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...................................  iii 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE ........................  1 
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF ARGU-
MENT ..................................................................  4 
ARGUMENT ...........................................................  6 
 I.   COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE 
A COMPELLING INTEREST IN ACHIEV-
ING QUALITATIVE, HOLISTIC DIVER-
SITY .............................................................  6 
A.   The Court Has Recognized A Compel-
ling Interest In Seeking Diversity’s 
Benefits ..................................................  6 
B.   The Holistic Diversity That The Uni-
versity Of Texas’s Admissions Program 
Seeks Is Exactly The Type Of Diversity 
This Court Has Encouraged ..................  8 
C.   Holistic Diversity Produces Profound 
Educational Benefits .............................  10 
D.  The United States’ International Com-
mitments Support Holistic-Review Pro-
grams .....................................................  15 
 II.   THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S INDI-
VIDUALIZED ADMISSIONS POLICY IS 
NARROWLY TAILORED TO ATTAIN THE 
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF QUALI-
TATIVE, HOLISTIC DIVERSITY ...............  16 
A.   The University Of Texas’s Admissions 
Policy Is Holistic And Individualized ...  17 
ii 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
B.   The University Of Texas’s Holistic-Re-
view Program Is Necessary To Attain 
Holistic Diversity ...................................  18 
C.   Purportedly “Race Neutral” Alternatives 
Do Not Achieve Holistic Diversity ........  22 
1.  The Top 10% Plan is not a “race neu-
tral” alternative to a holistic admis-
sions program ...................................  22 
2.  Holistic admissions programs must 
be race conscious, else they are not 
truly holistic .....................................  23 
3.  Eliminating consideration of race 
from holistic review would penalize 
applicants for whom race is central 
to their identities and experiences ....  26 
 III.   EVEN IF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S 
PLAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED, 
CONSIDERATION OF RACE MUST BE 
PERMITTED IN OTHER CIRCUM-
STANCES .....................................................  29 
CONCLUSION .......................................................  34 
 
iii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Page 
CASES 
Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009) ................... 29 
Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996) .............................. 17 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010)............... 11, 14 
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000) ....... 33 
Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) .......... 2, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12, 17, 18, 19, 21, 31 
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003) ............. 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 18, 19, 24, 29, 30, 31 
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 
S. Ct. 2401 (2015) .................................................... 31 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) ..................... 28 
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. 
Seattle School District No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 
(2007) ................................................. 8, 13, 18, 28, 30 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 
(1989) ....................................................................... 33 
R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) ...................... 26 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978) ...... 2, 6, 7, 8, 10, 21, 24, 27, 28, 30, 31, 33 
Schuette v. v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action, Intergration and Immigrant Rights 
and Fight for Equality By Any Means Neces-
sary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) ....... 2, 7, 10, 21 
 
iv 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) ...................... 12 
Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656 
(2015) ....................................................................... 17 
 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
138 Cong. Rec. 8068-71 (1992) ................................... 16 
2015 Inside Higher Ed Survey of College & 
University Admissions Directors ............................ 31 
International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660 
U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969 ......... 15 
International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, GA. Res 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR 
Supp. (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3, entered into force Jan. 3, 1976 ............. 16 
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Bakke’s Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745 (1996) .......... 32 
Charles W. Anderson, Prescribing the Life of 
the Mind (1993) ....................................................... 14 
Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Judging Opportunity Lost: 
Assessing the Viability of Race-Based Affirm-
ative Action After Fisher v. University of 
Texas, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 272 (2015) .................. 24, 27 
Alexander M. Bickel & Philip B. Kurland, 
DeFunis Is Moot—The Issue Is Not, 1 Learn-
ing & L. 17 (1974) ................................................... 18 
v 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page 
Robert J. Bork, A Murky Future, 2 Reg. 36 
(1978) ....................................................................... 32 
Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New 
Racial Preferences, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 1139 
(2008) ..................................................... 24, 26, 27, 28 
Devon W. Carbado, Intraracial Diversity, 60 
UCLA L. Rev. 1130 (2013) ................................. 14, 24 
Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Electoral 
Structures, and the First Amendment Right 
of Association, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1209 (2003) ............ 28 
Marjorie Cohn, Essay, Affirmative Action and 
the Equality Principle in Human Rights 
Treaties: United States’ Violation of Its Inter-
national Obligations, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 249 
(2003) ....................................................................... 15 
Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues 
of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, 
and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 
Willamette L. Rev. 541 (1996) ................................ 14 
Charles E. Daye, et al., Does Race Matter in 
Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empiri-
cal Analysis, 13 Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 75-S 
(2012) ....................................................................... 11 
Meera E. Deo, Empirically Derived Compelling 
State Interests in Affirmative Action Juris-
prudence, 65 Hastings L.J. 661 (2014) ....... 10, 12, 13 
Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational 
Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115 
(2015) ........................................................... 12, 13, 14 
vi 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page 
Meera E. Deo, The Promise of Grutter: Diverse 
Interactions at the University of Michigan Law 
School, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 63 (2011) ..... 11, 12, 13 
Richard A. Epstein, The Classical Liberal Con-
stitution (2013) ........................................................ 32 
Charles Fried, Saying What The Law Is (2004) ........ 32 
Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International Law in 
U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 25 Emory 
Int’l L. Rev. 197 (2011) ............................................ 15 
Patricia Gurin, The Compelling Needs for Di-
versity in Higher Education (Expert Report 
of Patricia Gurin), 5 Mich. J. Race & L. 363 
(1999) ....................................................................... 11 
Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups 
and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious 
Admissions, 15 J. Const. L. 463 (2012) ............ 18, 19 
Vinay Harpalani, Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 
15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. Heightened Scrutiny 
57 (2013) ............................................................ 24, 25 
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but 
Broadly Compelling: Defending Race-
Conscious Admissions After Fisher, 45 Seton 
Hall L. Rev. 761 (2015)...................................... 21, 23 
Catherine L. Horn & Stella M. Flores, The 
Civil Rights Project: Harvard University, Per-
cent Plans in College Admissions: A Compar-
ative Analysis of Three States’ Experiences 
(2003) ....................................................................... 20 
vii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page 
Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and Precon-
dition of Educational Autonomy, 31 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 557 (2003) .............................................. 6 
Mark S. Kende, Is Bakke Now a Super-Precedent 
and Does it Matter? The U.S. Supreme Court’s 
Updated Constitutional Approach to Affirma-
tive Action in Fisher, 16 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
Heightened Scrutiny 15 (2013) ............................... 33 
William C. Kidder, Misshaping the River: Prop-
osition 209 and Lessons for the Fisher Case, 
39 J.C. & U.L. 53 (2013) ......................................... 20 
Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our Cate-
gories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimi-
nation and Equal Employment Opportunity, 
47 Stan. L. Rev. 1161 (1995) ................................... 26 
Alan Krueger, et al., Race, Income and College 
in 25 Years: The Continuing Legacy of Segre-
gation and Discrimination (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Res., Working Paper 11445, June 2005) ...... 20 
Tamar Lewin & Richard Pérez-Peña, Colleges 
Brace for Uncertainty as Court Reviews Race 
in Admissions, N.Y. Times (July 1, 2015) .............. 32 
Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A “Workable, Race-
Neutral Alternative” To Affirmative Action?, 
39 J.C. & U.L. 127 (2013) ....................................... 20 
Jordan J. Paust, Essay, Race-Based Affirmative 
Action and International Law, 18 Mich. J. 
Int’l L. 659 (1997) .................................................... 16 
viii 
 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES—Continued 
Page 
Andy Sharma, Ann Moss Joyner, & Ashley 
Osment, Adverse Impact of Racial Isolation 
on Student Performance: A Study in North 
Carolina, 22 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives, 
No. 14 (2014) ........................................................... 14 
Society of American Law Teachers, Racial Dis-
crimination in the Legal Profession (June 30, 
2014) .......................................................................... 3 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment 
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
185 Science 1124 (1974) .......................................... 25 
Daniel M. Wegner, et al., Paradoxical Effects 
of Thought Suppression, 53 J. Personality & 
Soc. Psychol. 5 (1987) .............................................. 25 
J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke 
(1979) ............................................................. 8, 14, 21 
 BRIEF FOR SOCIETY OF AMERICAN 
LAW TEACHERS AS AMICUS CURIAE 
SUPPORTING RESPONDENTS1 
 The Society of American Law Teachers respect-
fully submits this brief as amicus curiae in support of 
respondents. 
INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 Founded in 1973, the Society of American Law 
Teachers (“SALT”) is the largest independent mem-
bership organization of legal academics in the United 
States.  Law professors, deans, librarians, and admin-
istrators from more than 200 law schools make up 
SALT’s membership.  Virtually all active SALT mem-
bers hold full-time positions in legal education.  
 Central to SALT’s mission is its commitment to 
“mak[ing] the legal profession more inclusive and 
reflective of the great diversity of this nation.”  SALT 
understands that the most effective way to make 
collegiate, graduate, and professional academic pro-
grams more representative of our Nation’s diverse 
populations is to utilize holistic admissions processes 
 
 1 Letters from the parties providing blanket consent to the 
filing of amicus briefs are on file with the Clerk of the Court.  No 
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and 
no party or counsel for a party made a monetary contribution 
intended to fund the preparation or submission of the brief.  No 
person other than amicus curiae, its members, or its counsel 
made a monetary contribution to the preparation or submission 
of this brief. 
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that incorporate race consciousness as one of many 
factors.  Since the Court’s decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), positive steps toward 
diversity have been realized, but African Americans 
and Latinos, in particular, remain woefully under-
represented at all levels of higher education.  Until 
this imbalance is corrected, race-conscious affirmative-
action programs remain a necessity. 
 SALT has supported race-conscious admission 
policies before this Court in four previous cases.  In 
1978, SALT filed a brief amicus curiae in support of 
petitioner in Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).  In 2003, SALT filed a 
brief amicus curiae in support of the University of 
Michigan Law School in Grutter.  SALT also sup-
ported the University of Texas with a brief amicus 
curiae in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin 
(“Fisher I”), 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013), and, most recent-
ly, supported respondents in Schuette v. Coalition to 
Defend Affirmative Action, Intergration and Immi-
grant Rights and Fight for Equality By Any Means 
Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
 SALT’s support of diversity in legal education has 
not been limited to the filing of briefs amicus curiae.  
It has organized many scholarly conferences; sup-
ported studies of bias in standardized testing, includ-
ing the LSAT and state bar exams; created programs 
to mentor diverse minorities, including young aca-
demics, law students, and potential law students; and 
led efforts to assure financial support for low-income 
law students.  SALT also recently submitted a shadow 
3 
report on Racial Discrimination in the Legal Pro-
fession to the United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (June 30, 2014), 
http://www.saltlaw.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/
June-30-SALT-FINAL-to-CERD-2.pdf. 
 The issues raised in the present case are of partic-
ular concern to SALT and its membership.  Although 
this case is focused on undergraduate admissions, 
SALT recognizes that each law school’s ability to 
admit a strong and diverse entering class is directly 
tied to the pool of available college graduates.  A rul-
ing against the University of Texas will be followed by 
public universities across the Nation.  If universities 
throughout the country are forced to abandon race-
conscious admission programs, the number of racially 
diverse undergraduate students will decrease dra-
matically.  In turn, the pool of graduates entering the 
legal profession, government service, and positions of 
leadership in the private sector will not reflect the 
diverse talents, resources and capabilities of this 
Nation. 
  
4 
INTRODUCTION AND 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 For nearly four decades, this Court has held that 
race-conscious admissions policies satisfy the Equal 
Protection Clause when race is employed as “a posi-
tive or favorable factor” to “achiev[e] the educational 
benefits of a more diverse student body.”  Fisher I, 
133 S. Ct. at 2417.  The Fifth Circuit’s decision is 
faithful to that principle and should be affirmed.  
 The University of Texas selects applicants based 
on multiple criteria to secure the numerous educa-
tional benefits that come from having an accom-
plished, diverse, and vibrant student body.  Although 
many students are admitted based solely on class 
rank, others are evaluated holistically to identify 
those students whose accomplishments transcend 
impersonal measurement.  In evaluating the latter 
group, the University’s holistic-review program treats 
each applicant as an individual, considering each 
person’s unique set of experiences, activities, inter-
ests, honors, economic circumstances, and race—but 
without assigning a fixed weight to any particular 
factor. 
 Such review is necessary to achieve the Univer-
sity of Texas’s educational mission, which includes 
providing students a holistically diverse educational 
environment.  As this Court has explained, holistic 
diversity involves more than simply achieving a pre-
determined racial balance—or fulfilling a quota.  
Rather, holistic diversity demands an educational 
5 
environment rich with diversity of viewpoint, diver-
sity of experience, diversity of talent, and—if a school 
chooses—diversity of race.  In the University’s con-
sidered judgment, it could not achieve the educational 
benefits of true holistic diversity without modestly 
considering race in the context of each individual’s 
other attributes, talents, and experiences.  
 To be sure, the University’s Top 10% Plan 
achieved a significant degree of purely numerical ra-
cial diversity.  But following years of experience with 
that program, the University’s expert academicians 
concluded that simply increasing the percentage of 
minority students did not provide the educational 
benefits of holistic diversity.  Because individuals of 
the same race do not invariably think alike, the 
University determined that greater diversity of race 
did not invariably translate into greater diversity of 
viewpoint, experience, or talent.  Accordingly, the 
University realized that race-conscious holistic review 
was the only workable means of achieving its vision 
of true holistic diversity—in both an inter- and intra-
racial sense.  That is precisely the sort of expert 
academic judgment to which this Court has virtually 
always deferred.  
 Moreover, the University of Texas did not arrive 
at its considered judgment in a vacuum.  Rather, like 
countless other institutions, the University expressly 
relied upon this Court’s long line of decisions affirm-
ing—and reaffirming—the wide latitude universities 
enjoy to pursue holistic diversity through modest 
race-conscious means.  To invalidate the University’s 
6 
program now after decades of decisions affirming 
similar plans would destabilize American higher edu-
cation, fatally undermine the academic autonomy of 
public universities, and erode the progress already 
achieved—and still needed—of greater holistic diver-
sity in higher education and corresponding profes-
sions and leadership positions.  
ARGUMENT 
I. COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES HAVE A 
COMPELLING INTEREST IN ACHIEVING 
QUALITATIVE, HOLISTIC DIVERSITY 
A. The Court Has Recognized A Compel-
ling Interest In Seeking Diversity’s Ben-
efits 
 This Court has repeatedly recognized that insti-
tutions of higher learning have a compelling interest 
in the educational benefits that flow from a diverse 
student body.  
 In Bakke, Justice Powell wrote that a university’s 
First Amendment freedom to make independent 
educational judgments “includes the selection of its 
student body.”  438 U.S. at 311-12 (citing Sweezy v. 
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring in the judgment)).  Universities 
have various ideas how to accomplish their pedagogi-
cal objectives.  Neal Kumar Katyal, The Promise and 
Precondition of Educational Autonomy, 31 Hastings 
Const. L.Q. 557 (2003).  But it is clear that one way 
universities may go about creating an ideal learning 
environment is to ensure that the admissions process 
7 
produces a diverse student body.  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
311-15. 
 In Grutter, the Court adopted Justice Powell’s 
rationale and held that the University of Michigan 
Law School had “a compelling interest in attaining a 
diverse student body.”  539 U.S. at 328.  The Court 
accepted the Law School’s argument that it needed a 
critical mass of minority students because of the “sub-
stantial” educational benefits that flow from student-
body diversity.  Id. at 330; see also id. at 392-93 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“There is no constitutional 
objection to the goal of considering race as one modest 
factor among many others to achieve diversity.”). 
 And in Fisher I, the Court accepted and reiter-
ated the rulings in Bakke and Grutter that “obtaining 
the educational benefits of ‘student body diversity is a 
compelling state interest that can justify the use of 
race in university admissions.’ ” 133 S. Ct. at 2417-18 
(quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 325).  Indeed, so long 
as programs are “designed to benefit * * * all stu-
dents, regardless of color, by enhancing diversity,” 
this Court’s precedent does not prohibit such policies.  
Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1640 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment). 
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B. The Holistic Diversity That The Univer-
sity Of Texas’s Admissions Program Seeks 
Is Exactly The Type Of Diversity This 
Court Has Encouraged 
 Significantly, however, the compelling state 
interest that Bakke, Grutter, and Fisher I recognized 
is not diversity for diversity’s sake.  Rather, diversity 
is a tool to further a university’s educational mission.  
The Court approved of the use of diversity as a means 
to an educational end, not an end in itself.  
 Thus, courts should defer to a university’s defini-
tion of the type of diversity that it needs to attain 
diversity’s educational benefits.  See Parents Involved 
in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 792 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
part and concurring in the judgment) (stressing that 
universities must receive “particular latitude in de-
fining diversity”).  After all, diversity is “idiosyn-
cratic” and “dependent on the eye of the beholding 
institution,” not reducible to a simple formula.  See J. 
Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke 304 
(1979).  The Constitution does not prescribe any pre-
cise manner in which universities must define diver-
sity for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause.  
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418-20 (noting that the Court 
defers on this point to the “experience and expertise” 
of educational professionals); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314 
(“[A] university must have wide discretion in 
making the sensitive judgments as to who should 
be admitted.”). 
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 For example, in Grutter, the University of Michi-
gan Law School determined that “a ‘critical mass’ of 
underrepresented minorities is necessary to further 
its compelling interest in securing the educational 
benefits of a diverse student body.”  539 U.S. at 333.  
The Law School explained that it needed a critical 
mass of minority students not because of “any belief 
that minority students always (or even consistently) 
express some characteristic minority viewpoint on 
any issue,” but rather because “diminishing the force 
of such stereotypes is both a crucial part of the Law 
School’s mission, and one that it cannot accomplish 
with only token numbers of minority students.”  Ibid.  
And this Court deferred to the Law School’s explana-
tion for its need for a critical mass. 
 Similarly, here, the University of Texas has de-
termined that purely numeric racial diversity—di-
versity based solely on skin color—is not sufficient to 
meet its educational goals.  Rather, the University’s 
interest is in achieving “holistic” diversity.  Race is a 
component of that diversity, but only one component.  
 Such holistic diversity—as opposed to mere skin-
color diversity—is precisely the type of diversity this 
Court not only has accepted but has essentially 
encouraged schools to pursue, emphasizing that in-
dividuals of the same race should not be seen as 
alike.  “In cautioning against ‘impermissible racial 
stereotypes,’ this Court has rejected the assumption 
that ‘members of the same racial group—regardless 
of their age, education, economic status, or the com-
munity in which they live—think alike, share the 
10 
same political interests, and will prefer the same 
candidates at the polls.”  Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1634 
(quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
 Indeed, the type of diversity that the University 
of Texas seeks through its holistic-review program is 
the type of diversity of which Justice Powell spoke in 
Bakke.  He emphasized that the interest in attaining 
the benefits of a diverse classroom “is not an interest 
in simple ethnic diversity, in which a specified per-
centage of the student body is in effect guaranteed to 
be members of selected ethnic groups.”  Bakke, 438 
U.S. at 315.  Rather, the “diversity that furthers a 
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader 
array of qualifications and characteristics of which 
racial or ethnic origin is but a single though im-
portant element.”  Ibid. 
C. Holistic Diversity Produces Profound 
Educational Benefits 
 Extensive empirical data bear out the benefits of 
such diversity.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387-88 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he objective of racial diversity can 
be accepted based on empirical data known to [the 
Court].”).2 Indeed, the benefits of such holistic diver-
sity are myriad.  
 
 2 See, e.g., Meera E. Deo, Empirically Derived Compelling 
State Interests in Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 65 Hastings 
L.J. 661, 686-90 (2014) (showing “how benefits of diversity in-
clude improved learning for all students through an opportunity 
to hear and learn from people with viewpoints that may differ 
(Continued on following page) 
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 Diversity “enhance[s] classroom dialogue.”  Fisher I, 
133 S. Ct. at 2418.  Because “the process of learning 
occurs both formally in a classroom setting and in-
formally outside of it,” students of differing back-
grounds often “stimulate one another to reexamine 
even their most deeply held assumptions about them-
selves and their world.”  Christian Legal Soc’y Chap-
ter of the Univ. of Cal. v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 
704-05 (2010) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quotation 
marks omitted).  Classroom conversations that incor-
porate diverse perspectives are superior because they 
are “personal and related to reality,” and they “make 
the conversations livelier.”  Meera E. Deo, The Prom-
ise of Grutter: Diverse Interactions at the University 
of Michigan Law School, 17 Mich. J. Race & L. 63, 
100 (2011).  Sparking conversation from various 
viewpoints is central to the very “business of a uni-
versity”: fostering that “atmosphere which is most 
conducive to speculation, experiment, and creation.” 
 
 
from their own”); Charles E. Daye, et al., Does Race Matter 
in Educational Diversity? A Legal and Empirical Analysis, 13 
Rutgers Race & L. Rev. 75-S, 76-S (2012) (“[E]xtensive quantita-
tive and qualitative empirical data support the finding that a 
racially diverse law student body provides educational benefits 
for students, for their institution, and for society, especially if 
there is significant interaction among students from diverse 
backgrounds.”); Patricia Gurin, The Compelling Needs for Di-
versity in Higher Education (Expert Report of Patricia Gurin), 5 
Mich. J. Race & L. 363, 365 (1999) (providing statistical data 
indicating that “interaction with peers from diverse racial back-
grounds,” both in the university classroom and informally, lead 
to increased “learning outcomes”).  
12 
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. 
at 263 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in judgment)).  
Students “become more open-minded while learning 
from classmates from different backgrounds.”  Deo, 
Promise, supra, at 100. 
 This is particularly true for law schools, where 
few “would choose to study in an academic vacuum, 
removed from the interplay of ideas and the exchange 
of views.”  Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950); 
see Meera E. Deo, Faculty Insights on Educational 
Diversity, 83 Fordham L. Rev. 3115, 3138-47 (2015) 
(discussing results from Diversity in Legal Academia 
project).  Empirical research on law-school curricula 
suggests that “when students include examples from 
their own lives in detailing their perspectives, these 
contributions go a long way in making abstract legal 
theories more concrete and accessible.”  Deo, Promise, 
supra, at 97-98.  Diversity helps ground legal con-
cepts in the “broader social context.”  Id. at 100.  
Regardless of whether diversity in a law-school class-
room changes students’ minds, it allows students to 
“see things from different viewpoints and therefore 
understand legal issues better.”  Id. at 99. 
 Diversity ameliorates “racial isolation and stereo-
types.”  Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418.  Without suffi-
cient diversity, “students of color are tokenized, 
treated as spokespeople for their race, and not ex-
pected to deviate from what others believe the racial 
‘norm’ to be.”  Meera E. Deo, Empirically Derived 
Compelling State Interests in Affirmative Action 
Jurisprudence, 65 Hastings L.J. 661, 691 (2014).  But 
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“having a critical mass of students of color provides 
an opportunity for a group’s majority perspective to 
be included while also allowing for inter-group diver-
sity and even opposition to what others from within 
the racial/ethnic group express.”  Id. at 690-91.  Di-
verse educational environments thus promote social 
cohesion and dispel prejudices borne of unfamiliarity.  
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330 (diversity “promotes cross-
racial understanding,” and “enables students to better 
understand persons of different races” (quotation marks 
and brackets omitted)).  In doing so, diversity quells 
racial hostilities and helps to “bring[ ] about the har-
mony and mutual respect among all citizens that our 
constitutional tradition has always sought.”  Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 394-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788, 797 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (stressing that “[a] compelling interest 
exists in avoiding racial isolation” because the Consti-
tution does not “mandate[ ]” that society “must accept 
the status quo of racial isolation in schools”).  
 Diversity also “better prepares students for an 
increasingly diverse workforce and society, and better 
prepares them as professionals.”  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
330.  This is particularly true in the legal context 
given that “so much of the law requires the ability to 
look at problems from multiple angles, in order to 
fully understand different experiences and assump-
tions.”  Deo, Promise, supra, at 99.  Furthermore, cli-
ents are increasingly global, and private law firms 
are increasingly international in scope.  Deo, Faculty 
Insights, supra, at 3146.  Studies have indicated that 
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diversity in classroom conversations better prepares 
students to deal with global clients and colleagues.  
Id. at 3146-47; Okianer Christian Dark, Incor-
porating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orien-
tation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 
Willamette L. Rev. 541, 553-54 (1996).  Moreover, em-
pirical research has demonstrated that racial isola-
tion in the classroom has negative consequences on 
academic performance and is associated with lower 
average test scores.  Andy Sharma, Ann Moss Joyner, 
& Ashley Osment, Adverse Impact of Racial Isolation 
on Student Performance: A Study in North Carolina, 
22 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives, No. 14, at 10 (2014). 
 Tradition, common sense, and empirical data, 
therefore, support the educational value of diversity.  
Indeed, race-conscious diversity is merely “an overdue 
update of th[e] time-honored concept” that diversity 
enriches higher education and “has been, historically, 
clearly related to a university’s function.”  Wilkinson, 
supra, at 281-82, 303.  After all, the mission of a 
university “is to prescribe the criteria of intelligent 
thought and action for a society.”  Charles W. Ander-
son, Prescribing the Life of the Mind xiv (1993).  And 
because “[s]tudents may be shaped as profoundly by 
their peers as by their teachers,” Martinez, 561 U.S. 
at 704 (Kennedy, J., concurring), diverse student 
bodies directly facilitate civic virtue, racial coopera-
tion, and critical thinking—both within the univer-
sity and beyond.  See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, 
Intraracial Diversity, 60 UCLA L. Rev. 1130, 1145-46 
(2013).  
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D. The United States’ International Com-
mitments Support Holistic-Review Pro-
grams 
 The United States, moreover, is not alone in its 
use of race-conscious measures.  In signing onto the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination (“CERD”), the United 
States joined a global consensus of 168 other coun-
tries that permit “special measures” to achieve racial 
equality.  See CERD, Art. 1(4) & 2(2), 660 U.N.T.S. 
195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969.  Specifically, 
CERD encourages “special and concrete measures to 
ensure the adequate development and protection of 
certain racial groups or individuals belonging to 
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full 
and equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms.”  Id. Art. 2(2).  And CERD provides, like 
this Court’s jurisprudence, that such measures “shall 
not be deemed racial discrimination” as long as they 
do not “continue[ ] after the objectives for which they 
were taken have been achieved.”  Id. Art. 1(4)). 
 Thus, the United States’ existing commitments in 
the global community support holistic-review pro-
grams.  See Rex D. Glensy, The Use of International 
Law in U.S. Constitutional Adjudication, 
25 Emory Int’l L. Rev. 197, 242 (2011) (noting that 
international norms support the use of affirmative-
action programs until “the goals of equality have been 
fulfilled”); Marjorie Cohn, Essay, Affirmative Action 
and the Equality Principle in Human Rights Treaties: 
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United States’ Violation of Its International Obliga-
tions, 43 Va. J. Int’l L. 249, 251 (2003) (“[A]ffirmative 
action treaty mandates constitute not only interna-
tional obligations, but also constitute a compelling 
government interest to support race-based affirma-
tive action programs.”); Jordan J. Paust, Essay, Race-
Based Affirmative Action and International Law, 18 
Mich. J. Int’l L. 659, 659 (1997) (observing that in-
ternational law “provides significant affirmation of 
the legal propriety of race-based affirmative action”).3 
II. THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S INDIVID-
UALIZED ADMISSIONS POLICY IS NAR-
ROWLY TAILORED TO ATTAIN THE 
EDUCATIONAL BENEFITS OF QUALITA-
TIVE, HOLISTIC DIVERSITY 
 The University of Texas’s holistic-review program 
is narrowly tailored to achieve the University’s com-
pelling interest in the benefits of qualitative, holistic 
diversity.  Strict scrutiny requires that a law “be 
narrowly tailored, not that it be ‘perfectly tailored.’ ” 
 
 
 3 See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR), GA. Res 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 
(No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, entered 
into force Jan. 3, 1976 (prohibiting discrimination or distinc- 
tions based upon race, color, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status); see also 138 Cong. Rec. 8068-71 (1992) (declaring that 
the United States’ obligations under ICCPR “permitted” race-
conscious measures that “are, at a minimum, rationally related 
to a legitimate governmental objective”). 
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Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1671 
(2015); see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 998-99 (1996) 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (narrow tailoring requires 
that laws be “reasonably necessary to serve a compel-
ling interest”).  A race-conscious admissions policy is 
narrowly tailored when its consideration of race is 
reasonably necessary to “achieve the educational 
benefits of diversity,” Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420, 
particularly when that consideration is holistic and 
individualized.  Race may be considered as one “mod-
est factor among many others,” Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), when “no workable 
race-neutral alternatives” would likely achieve the 
university’s particular vision of diversity, Fisher I, 
133 S. Ct. at 2420.  The University of Texas’s holistic-
review program readily satisfies that standard.  
A. The University Of Texas’s Admissions 
Policy Is Holistic And Individualized 
 Like many other admissions policies, the Uni-
versity of Texas’s holistic-review policy considers race 
as only one modest factor in the context of an indi-
vidualized assessment of each applicant.  For those 
applicants not admitted under the Top 10% Plan, the 
University evaluates leadership, extracurricular ac-
tivities, honors or awards, work experience, socio-
economic status, and race in the unique context 
of each applicant’s entire experience, Fisher I, 133 
S. Ct. at 2415-17, thus benefitting minority and non-
minority applicants alike.  
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 The use of race in this review process is targeted 
and narrow.  In fact, “the weight given to race in UT 
undergraduate admissions is less than that upheld in 
Grutter.”  Vinay Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial 
Groups and the Constitutionality of Race-Conscious 
Admissions, 15 J. Const. L. 463, 529 (2012); see also 
Pet.’s Br. 8-9 (acknowledging that “race can be de-
terminative only for * * * a small segment of the 
freshman class”).  The University of Texas’s approach 
“ensure[s] that each applicant is evaluated as an 
individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s 
race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her 
application.”  Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420 (quotation 
marks omitted); see Grutter, 539 U.S. at 392-93 (Ken-
nedy, J., dissenting) (reasoning that race-conscious 
policies are narrowly tailored when “each applicant 
receives individual consideration and that race does 
not become a predominant factor in the admissions 
decisionmaking”); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 788-
89 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reaffirming this princi-
ple); Alexander M. Bickel & Philip B. Kurland, 
DeFunis Is Moot—The Issue Is Not, 1 Learning & L. 
17, 19, 62 (1974) (distinguishing “a racial quota” from 
“legitimate affirmative action” and suggesting the 
latter may involve “a case where race was used as one 
among many factors to determine admission”). 
B. The University Of Texas’s Holistic- 
Review Program Is Necessary To Attain 
Holistic Diversity 
 The holistic-review program is necessary to 
achieve the University of Texas’s compelling interest 
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in qualitative, holistic diversity.  While the Top 10% 
Plan has achieved a measure of numerical diversity, 
it has not been sufficient to achieve the type of quali-
tative diversity that the University deems central to 
its educational mission.  As this Court has reaffirmed, 
universities need not exhaust “every conceivable race-
neutral alternative” in order to satisfy strict scrutiny.  
Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2420.  Rather, strict scrutiny is 
met when universities, after “serious, good faith con-
sideration,” legitimately conclude that they cannot 
“achieve sufficient diversity” with “available, work-
able race-neutral alternatives.”  Id. (emphasis added).  
 Here, the University of Texas implemented its 
Grutter-compliant admissions program after trying 
for seven years to achieve qualitative diversity with 
its Top 10% Plan alone.  During that seven-year 
period, the University saw increases only in statisti-
cal diversity—i.e., the “simple ethnic diversity” that 
does not further a “compelling state interest” in 
educational diversity. Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2418 
(quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 315).  This is not surpris-
ing: the Top 10% Plan does not expressly consider 
diversity of thought, viewpoint, or experience.  See 
Harpalani, Diversity Within Racial Groups, supra, at 
498-500.  While it increases statistical diversity by 
automatically admitting the top 10% of students at 
high schools where the students are predominantly 
minority, that is only one measure of diversity.  The 
Top 10% Plan leaves out students who may not be in 
the top 10% of their graduating class but who the 
University may consider to contribute to diversity in 
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ways that students admitted through the Top 10% 
Plan may not.  Thus, after comprehensive, good-faith 
consideration, the University determined that a ho-
listic, race-conscious program is necessary to achieve 
its vision of qualitative diversity. 
 Empirical research and lived experience confirm 
that purportedly race-neutral admissions programs 
are no substitute for holistic programs like the Uni-
versity of Texas’s.  See, e.g., Catherine L. Horn & 
Stella M. Flores, The Civil Rights Project: Harvard 
University, Percent Plans in College Admissions: A 
Comparative Analysis of Three States’ Experiences 12, 
59-60 (2003); see also Marvin Lim, Percent Plans: A 
“Workable, Race-Neutral Alternative” To Affirmative 
Action?, 39 J.C. & U.L. 127, 132, 141-62 (2013).  In 
California, for example, which prohibits affirmative 
action, empirical studies have demonstrated that 
“class-based affirmative action programs cannot sub-
stitute for race-conscious policies at highly selective 
American colleges and universities.”  William C. 
Kidder, Misshaping the River: Proposition 209 and 
Lessons for the Fisher Case, 39 J.C. & U.L. 53, 116 
(2013).  Indeed, although the “correlation between 
race and family income” is “strong,” it “is not strong 
enough to permit the latter to function as a useful 
proxy for race in the pursuit of diversity.”  Alan 
Krueger, et al., Race, Income and College in 25 Years: 
The Continuing Legacy of Segregation and Discrimi-
nation 32 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper 
11445, June 2005), http://www.nber.org/papers/w11445. 
pdf.  When coupled with the University of Texas’s own 
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experience from 1996 to 2003, these studies under-
score the University’s considered judgment that no 
“race-neutral alternatives” could “achieve sufficient 
diversity” for purposes of UT’s particular “educational 
mission.”  See Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (empha-
sis added).  
 Petitioner’s argument that race-conscious mea-
sures are unnecessary because “UT is one of the most 
diverse public universities in the country,” Pet.’s Br. 
24, is mistaken in that it focuses on skin color alone.  
Universities have a compelling interest in the educa-
tional benefits from a diversity of viewpoints—race 
being but a single element of such diversity.  Contrary 
to petitioner’s assumptions, diversity is both “color-
conscious” and “color-blind.”  Wilkinson, supra, at 
304.  On the one hand, diversity and holistic review 
are inherently race conscious because race is part of 
each individual’s unique experience and identity.  See 
Vinay Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored but Broadly 
Compelling: Defending Race-Conscious Admissions 
After Fisher, 45 Seton Hall L. Rev. 761, 768-69, 796-
805 (2015).  On the other, diversity is also “color-
blind,” because all individuals “are different” and 
thus all individuals “can be diverse.”  Wilkinson, 
supra, at 304.  
 By “focus[ing] solely on ethnic diversity,” peti-
tioner’s contentions “hinder rather than further at-
tainment of genuine diversity.”  Bakke, 438 U.S. at 
315.  Indeed, it is precisely because “all individuals 
of the same race” do not “think alike,” Schuette, 134 
S. Ct. at 1634, that the qualitative diversity provided 
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by the University of Texas’s holistic-review program 
is necessary to supplement the quantitative diversity 
achieved by the Top 10% Plan.  
C. Purportedly “Race Neutral” Alterna-
tives Do Not Achieve Holistic Diversity 
1. The Top 10% Plan is not a “race-
neutral” alternative to a holistic 
admissions program 
 Petitioner argues that “there are numerous other 
available race-neutral means of achieving” diversity.  
Pet.’s Br. 47.  She points primarily to the Top 10% 
Plan as a race-neutral alternative that has driven 
increases in the enrollment of minority students at 
the University of Texas.  Id. at 10-11.  
 Contrary to petitioner’s suggestion that the Top 
10% Plan is a race-neutral alternative, that plan 
does take race into account.  As the Fifth Circuit 
explained, the Top 10% Plan increases diversity solely 
because of the “de facto segregation of schools in 
Texas.”  Pet. App. 32a-33a; see id. at 33a-38a & nn.98, 
101.  Texas developed the Top 10% Plan “against the 
backdrop of this challenged reality in their effort to 
achieve a diverse student body.”  Pet. App. 33a.  That 
is, conscious of the racial makeup in Texas schools, 
the Texas political branches devised the Top 10% Plan 
as a way to achieve racial diversity, without having to 
overtly consider race at the point of admission.  Thus, 
contrary to petitioner’s assertions, the Top 10% Plan 
is a deliberately race-conscious program that merely 
moved the consideration of race from the University 
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of Texas admissions office to a point earlier in time, 
when Texas officials devised the plan. 
 That the Top 10% Plan actually does consider 
race undermines petitioner’s argument that diversity 
can be achieved through race-neutral means.  And if 
race must be taken into account to attain a diverse 
class, better to allow schools to do so in the context 
of a highly individualized, holistic-review process.  A 
percentage plan is a blunt instrument that, at least in 
Texas, arguably relies more on race than a holistic 
admissions program.  See Pet. App. 32a-38a.  Yet 
petitioner agrees that the Top 10% Plan comports 
with the Constitution.  Pet.’s Br. 47 (arguing that 
Texas should “uncap[ ] the Top 10% Law”).  If such a 
deliberately race-conscious program is Constitutional, 
then surely so must be the modest consideration of 
race in a holistic assessment of multiple factors that 
also bear on the broader diversity needed to achieve 
the University’s educational objectives. 
2. Holistic admissions programs must 
be race conscious, else they are not 
truly holistic 
 There is no dispute that the University of Texas 
can perform holistic review for the students not 
admitted under the Top 10% Plan.  Rather, petitioner 
asserts only that the University’s holistic review can-
not consider race.  But race-blind holistic review 
is not only a contradiction in terms, it is infeasible. 
See Harpalani, Narrowly Tailored, supra, at 788-90; 
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Mario L. Barnes, Erwin Chemerinsky, & Angela 
Onwuachi-Willig, Judging Opportunity Lost: Assess-
ing the Viability of Race-Based Affirmative Action 
After Fisher v. University of Texas, 62 UCLA L. 
Rev. 272, 290 (2015); Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. 
Harris, The New Racial Preferences, 96 Cal. L. Rev. 
1139, 1146-48 (2008). 
 To be effective, holistic review must be truly 
holistic—that is, it must assess each applicant as an 
individual to the fullest possible context of his or her 
life, talents, and experiences.  Grutter, 539 U.S. at 
392-93 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  And because it 
cannot seriously be disputed that race often provides 
critical insight into the lives and experiences of ap-
plicants, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18 & n.51, holis-
tic review is simply not possible without considering 
race as one modest factor among many others, see 
Barnes, Chemerinsky, & Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at 
290-91.  Race and culture remain factors of enormous 
significance in the totality of one’s experiences.  Put 
simply, because peoples’ lives are not “color blind,” 
neither can a holistic admissions policy be. 
 As long as schools evaluate more than simply 
test scores and grades, the exclusion of race from 
consideration is unavoidable as a practical matter.  
Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1146-48.  Admissions 
officers may inadvertently discern an applicant’s race 
many ways—via essays, personal statements, activi-
ties, as well as “names which are highly correlated 
with racial group membership.”  Vinay Harpalani, 
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Fisher’s Fishing Expedition, 15 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 
Heightened Scrutiny 57, 69 (2013).  Consider a col-
lege application from an individual who lists youth 
leadership in his or her African Methodist Episcopal 
Church as an activity.  Or consider an application 
from a first-generation Latina high-school senior 
whose personal essay discusses her immigrant par-
ents’ experiences and how she learned to thrive in an 
English-dominated culture even though Spanish is 
the language spoken at home.  If the reader is to con-
duct holistic review but cannot consider race, the 
reader is confronted with uncomfortable choices about 
how to handle these applications.  
 Moreover, if the reader cannot consider race, the 
reader would be confronted with an impossible task, 
because race affects assessments of individuals con-
sciously or unconsciously, regardless of intentions and 
any mandate from this Court.  As a result, removing 
the term “race” from the cover of an admissions form 
does not remove the concept of “race” from the admis-
sions process.  Harpalani, Fishing Expedition, supra, 
at 69.  Social psychology has shown that even when 
people are instructed to ignore or disregard certain 
information, “they tend to incorporate it into subse-
quent judgments nonetheless.”  Daniel M. Wegner, 
et al., Paradoxical Effects of Thought Suppression, 53 
J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 5, 6-9 (1987); see also 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124 
(1974).  Just as Dostoevsky’s polar bear will occupy 
the mind of anyone challenged not to think about it, 
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so too will the admonition not to think about race 
generate an unspoken preoccupation with that sub-
ject.  See Linda Hamilton Krieger, Content of Our 
Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimina-
tion and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 Stan. L. 
Rev. 1161, 1240 (1995).  
 Accordingly, “eliminating the express considera-
tion of race” would not “eliminat[e] race itself from 
the admissions context.”  Carbado & Harris, supra, at 
1146.  Rather, it would simply turn race into an un-
stated factor that nonetheless would affect admis-
sions decisions but without the transparency and 
fairness of including it as an overt factor among many 
others. 
3. Eliminating consideration of race 
from holistic review would penalize 
applicants for whom race is central 
to their identities and experiences 
 Despite its seeming neutrality, a rule precluding 
consideration of race in a holistic admissions process 
would disadvantage applicants for whom race is a 
significant part of their application.  Like all private 
speakers, applicants have a protected interest in 
speaking about race and ethnicity (including their 
own), and the State generally may not regulate such 
speech based on its content.  See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 
505 U.S. 377, 382-83 (1992).  But formally race-blind 
policies not only discount expressions of racial identi-
ty based on their content, they also disadvantage 
applicants whose accomplishments, experiences, and 
27 
talents are best understood in light of their complete 
identity, including race.  Carbado & Harris, supra, at 
1146-52, 1186, 1191-93.  
 As Bakke recognized, race is integral to the iden-
tity and experiences of many qualified applicants.  
438 U.S. at 317 n.51 (“[R]ace can be helpful infor-
mation in enabling the admission officer to under-
stand more fully what a particular candidate has 
accomplished—and against what odds.”  (quotation 
marks omitted)).  Indeed, “the life story of many 
people—particularly with regard to describing dis-
advantage—simply does not make sense without 
reference to race.”  Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1148.  
Racial identity provides “a fuller picture” of some 
applicants’ backgrounds and thus a clearer under-
standing of “their merits for admission.”  Barnes, 
Chemerinsky, & Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at 292-93. 
 By excluding such details, however, race-blind 
policies discourage expressions of racial identity 
and favor those “applicants who subordinate or sup-
press their race.”  Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1149.  
Such policies destroy the communicative impact of 
certain individuals’ achievements and impoverish the 
admissions process.  See Barnes, Chemerinsky, & 
Onwuachi-Willig, supra, at 292-93.  In doing so, race-
blind policies disadvantage “applicants for whom race 
is a fundamental part of their sense of self,” and 
privilege those “applicants who (a) view their racial 
identity as irrelevant or inessential and (b) make no 
express mention of it in the application process.”  
Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1148-49.  
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 To be sure, race-blind policies do not, by their 
literal terms, prohibit discussion of race.  But such 
policies nonetheless tell applicants that only certain 
aspects of their identity are worth considering—and 
that the State will define for them what aspects will 
matter.  Ibid.  This Court’s decisions do not permit 
such intrusions on “the individual’s right to self-
define.”  Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Racial Identity, Elec-
toral Structures, and the First Amendment Right of 
Association, 91 Cal. L. Rev. 1209, 1222 (2003); see 
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317-18 (stressing that the 
unique qualifications expressed in an individual’s 
application must be placed “on the same footing for 
consideration”). 
 Indeed, just as individuals may not be “forced to 
live under a state-mandated racial label,” Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring), 
neither should they be forced to endure a state-
mandated label that overtly devalues their racial 
identity, see Carbado & Harris, supra, at 1213-14.  
“Under our Constitution the individual, child or 
adult, can find his own identity, can define her own 
persona, without state intervention.”  Parents In-
volved, 551 U.S. at 797 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
After all, “the right to define one’s own concept of ex-
istence” and “personhood” would be meaningless were 
such views “formed under compulsion of the State.”  
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (quot-
ation marks omitted).  Yet this is precisely what 
petitioner seeks, by requiring applicants to public 
institutions of higher learning to eliminate or mask 
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their race when presenting their individual “person-
hood” for consideration for admission.  Regardless of 
whether the Constitution permits such an imposition, 
it certainly cannot be read to require it.  See Bartlett 
v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 25 (2009) (plurality op.) 
(reasoning that it would be a sad “irony” if the Equal 
Protection Clause “were interpreted to entrench 
racial differences”).  
III. EVEN IF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS’S 
PLAN IS NOT NARROWLY TAILORED, CON-
SIDERATION OF RACE MUST BE PER-
MITTED IN OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES 
 Regardless of what the Court decides about the 
University of Texas’s holistic-review admissions pol-
icy, this Court should reiterate that other institutions 
of higher learning—particularly law schools and 
other professional schools—may be permitted to con-
sider race in admissions, as this Court held in Bakke 
and Grutter.  
 As discussed in Part I.C, law schools have a 
particularly compelling interest in having diverse 
student bodies.  As amicus’s members can attest from 
experience, legal doctrines take on new meaning 
when applied in different contexts, and student di-
versity significantly helps students understand legal 
issues from different perspectives.  Moreover, law 
schools must train students to see legal issues from 
all sides, in order to strengthen the quality of their 
arguments.  And law schools must prepare students 
for an increasingly global and diverse world. 
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 But percentage plans do nothing to further grad-
uate and professional schools’ compelling need for 
diversity because such schools do not draw students 
from a fixed geographic area in which the racial 
makeup of schools is highly concentrated.  Thus, even 
if the University of Texas’s percentage plan is deemed 
an adequate “race-neutral alternative,” this Court 
should not disturb the fundamental rule of Bakke and 
Grutter.  Race-conscious admissions policies may still 
be necessary to achieve diversity at many, if not most, 
law schools and other institutions of higher learning.  
 Because diversity is nuanced and many faceted, 
the blunt tools of a percentage plan cannot alone 
achieve meaningful educational diversity in all cir-
cumstances.  Different universities in different states 
must be free to tailor their admissions programs to 
meet their own demographics, financial resources, 
and educational objectives.  Courts are not equipped 
to fashion these policies, and the judicial process is 
not equipped to evaluate such policies on an ongoing 
basis, as universities can and must.  See Parents 
Involved, 551 U.S. at 798 (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting the importance of “the creativity of experts” 
and “administrators” in “continuing the important 
work of bringing together students of different racial, 
ethnic, and economic backgrounds”). 
 Fidelity to precedent is particularly salient here 
given the reliance interests at stake.  Law schools 
and universities across the Nation have indisputably 
adopted race-conscious policies partly in reliance 
on this Court’s decisions in Grutter and Bakke.  See 
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Fisher I, 133 S. Ct. at 2416; Pet.’s Br. 48 (acknowledg-
ing that the University of Texas, like many schools, 
understood Grutter to permit “incorporation of race 
into admissions decisions as long as the system is 
‘holistic’ ”).  Public institutions have carefully studied 
this Court’s decisions to determine how they could 
achieve diversity’s educational benefits while still 
comporting with the Constitution’s requirements.  
Amicus’s members have been involved in helping to 
painstakingly craft law-school-admissions programs 
that take race into account without assigning race 
any numerical score. 
 Colleges and universities are ill prepared to de-
velop new strategies for boosting diversity in admis-
sions without considering race.  In a recent survey of 
admissions directors, only 6% reported that their in-
stitution had created a specific plan for how it would 
handle admissions if this Court were to limit or ban 
considering race in admissions.  2015 Inside Higher 
Ed. Survey of College & University Admissions Di-
rectors, at 26, https://www.insidehighered.com/system/
files/media/booklet-admission-survey-2015.pdf. 
 In light of the important reliance interests of 
school administrators and professors throughout the 
Nation, stare decisis demands that this Court follow 
its decisions permitting race-conscious admissions 
policies.  See Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 
135 S. Ct. 2401, 2410 (2015).  Indeed, Grutter’s 
central holding reflects a stable constitutional rule 
that dates back more than 35 years.  Since Bakke, it 
has been understood that the Constitution permits 
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universities to “use race as one factor in deciding to 
admit students so long as other factors are also used 
in an effort to achieve diversity in the student body.”  
Robert J. Bork, A Murky Future, 2 Reg. 36 (1978).  
Over time, that decision’s core has been clarified and 
refined in the crucible of subsequent decisions, see 
Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke’s 
Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1754-80 (1996), and this 
Court’s reaffirmations of Bakke’s core principle have 
engendered the reliance of university administrators 
and state legislators.  
 Hence, as petitioner tacitly recognizes, a ruling 
against the University of Texas would upend diversity 
measures that “have become a standard element of 
admissions systems of universities throughout the 
country.”  Pet.’s Br. 48.  As one university president 
put it, a decision “that it’s unconstitutional to con-
sider race at all will have domino effects across the 
whole country, and will sweep across private univer-
sities as well as public ones.”  Tamar Lewin & Rich-
ard Pérez-Peña, Colleges Brace for Uncertainty as 
Court Reviews Race in Admissions, N.Y. Times (July 
1, 2015), at A14.  Indeed, “[k]nocking out” the Univer-
sity of Texas’s “present system in favor of a strictly 
enforced color-blind norm would cause a huge up-
heaval in a system that” can be better adjusted “by 
administrators on campus.”  Richard A. Epstein, The 
Classical Liberal Constitution 539 (2013). 
 In addition, stare decisis is not simply a means of 
preserving reliance interests; its stabilizing force has 
independent constitutional weight.  Charles Fried, 
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Saying What The Law Is 241 (2004) (reasoning that, 
unless “the Court is in fact constrained by doctrine,” 
“there is no constitutional law; there are only consti-
tutional decisions”).  As Justice Powell stressed in 
Bakke, the “consistent application of the Constitution 
from one generation to the next” is “a critical feature 
of its coherent interpretation.”  438 U.S. at 299.  
Constitutional decisions take “root[ ] throughout the 
community” and provide “continuity over significant 
periods of time.”  Ibid.  Accordingly, this Court “ha[s] 
always required” a “special justification” for over-
ruling constitutional precedent.  Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428, 443-44 (2000).  
 But here, no special justification exists for over-
ruling the central principle of Bakke and Grutter.  
As many have noted, Bakke stands as a “super-
precedent” in that (1) “[i]t is a well tested precedent 
in court,” (2) “it has become the foundation for legal 
doctrine,” and (3) “there has been substantial societal 
reliance in the U.S. and even abroad.”  Mark S. 
Kende, Is Bakke Now a Super-Precedent and Does it 
Matter? The U.S. Supreme Court’s Updated Consti-
tutional Approach to Affirmative Action in Fisher, 16 
U. Pa. J. Const. L. Heightened Scrutiny 15, 24 (2013).  
Thus, given the “venerability” of Bakke and “the 
difficulty of changing, or even clearly identifying, the 
intervening law that has been based on [it],” this 
Court should affirm that decision and its progeny.  Cf. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 34 (1989) 
(Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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CONCLUSION 
 For the reasons set forth above and in respon-
dents’ brief, the Fifth Circuit’s judgment should be 
affirmed. 
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